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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest and justify a simple 
approach to arms compe.ti tions, wherein arms competitions are viewed as 
disaggregated competitions between pairs of weapons systems for the 
execution of mutually incompatible policy goals. This approach is 
derived from a decision theoretic model of armament choice, wherein 
military force level decision makers make trade offs between 
alternative strategies of weapons deployment for the achievement of 
national foreign policy objectives, Data representing a cross-section 
of the US and USSR military arsenals is employed in a qausi-first 
difference two stage least squares analysis to evidence the 
propositions of the model' and this approach. 
POLICY COMPONENTS OF ARMS COMPETITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the pioneering work of Lewis Richardson, the study of 
arms races has formed a central part of the formal research in 
international relations. 1 Much of this work, however, has been 
disappointing; the statistical results have been rather unimpressive. 
The research reported in this paper is based on the premise that a 
major reason for these poor results is an inappropriate use of 
aggregation. Fmploying a decision theoretic framework� one which is 
not inconsistent with the rational actor, bureaucratic and 
organizational paradigms of political science -- this paper develops a 
testable model of arms races which makes explicit the relation of arms 
growth to the achievement of a nation's foreign policy goals, and, 
moreover, yields stronger statistical results than much of the 
previous work in this field. Implicit in this approach is an 
intriquing counter-intuitive proposition: that arms control can itself 
be a cause of arms races. 
PREVIOUS RFSEARCH 
The model formulated by Richardson is essentially a 
descriptive model, its primary contribution is that it encompasses 
much of our intuition about the causes and development of arms 
competitions. It posits arms races as competition between two 
mutually distrustful nations, wherein military budget appropriations 
or military buildups by one nation are answered in-kind by the 
competing nation(s). According to this model competitive increases 
continue indefinitely or until abated by the wealth limits of the 
competing nations or by war. 
The most plausible operationalization of the Richardson model 
is as a difference equation (equation 1). This formulation describes 
nations X's and nations Y's stock of weapons (or military budgets) at 
time t (Xt and Yt respectively) as a function of both their own 
previous stock of weapons (Xt-l and Yt-l respectively) and their 
adversary's previous stock of weapons (Yt-l and Xt_1): 
(1) 
p, & > O and a, r < O 
The primary problem with this model arises when trying to 
estimate it as it is not clear what X and Y should stand for in the 
arms race context. Richardson thought them to be measures of the 
''total armed might'' of the two mutually distrustful countries, and 
later tested the model with yearly defense budgets as proxies for X 
and Y. Most subsequent analyses have also employed defense budgets 
(see Chatterjee, 1974; Lambelet, 1976; Ruloff, 1975; Taagepera, 
Shiffler, Perkins, and Wagner, 1975). The model has further been 
applied to modern treatments of armament races in the missile age (see 
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Burns, 1959; Boulding, 1961; Brito and Intriligator, 1977; 
Intriligator and Brito, 1976; Luterbacher, 1976; McGuire, 1965, 1977; 
Saaty, 1968; and Taagepera, 1976). It should be noted that many of 
these later studies applied the Richardson model to stocks of weapons 
rather than to defense budgets. 
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The interpretation of defense budgets as a nation's ''total 
armed might'' is not entirely unreasonable, as increases in military 
budgets necessarily precede increases in ''total armed might. '' 
However, as evidenced in many of the above listed studies, such a 
proxy gives no indication of the putative arms competition between the 
two superpowers. Indeed, these previous investigations have found 
little support for the existence of Richardson arms races. Many 
scholars argued that the data employed (military budgets) was too 
clumsy to allow estimation of often small incremental changes in 
''total armed might. '' Indeed, aggregate measures such as budgets 
could well mask small incremental changes in weapons systems and there 
is no reason to expect total military budgets between two (or more) 
competing nations to be linked in a Richardson (or any other) fashion. 
But the analysis herein will argue that the problem is more 
fundamental and arises from the use of aggegrate data for the study of 
arms races. If many individual (disaggregated) arms races occur 
simultaneously between two countries, they may all be correlated, or 
they may ''heat up'' and ''cool down'' independently. In the former 
case, one would observe the classical sort of aggregate arms race 
typically considered in the prevailing literature. In the latter 
case, races related to various policy conflicts might ''cancel out, '' 
in which case aggregate arms stocks or military expenditures are 
constant, even though strenuous weapons competition is actually 
occurring, 
As indicated earlier, other scholars have examined the 
Richardson process through an analysis of the total stocks of weapons 
possessed by both sides of a competing pair of nations. Such an 
analysis, it was thought, might capture the subtle year-to-year 
changes in armaments which we expect to observe, However, these 
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approaches were often merely a misapplication of disaggregated data, a 
misapplication brought about by the poor conceptualization inherent in 
the Richardson model, Such armament studies have frequently centered 
upon competitions between complementary weapons as exemplified in 
Figure 1. Figure 1 depicts Soviet and American stocks of manned 
strategic bombers, and registers the perceived decrease in American 
and Soviet bomber strength, However, as is true of many of the 
earlier mentioned disaggregative studies it exemplifies, no arms 
competition is evident in Figure 1, 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HFRE 
Stated most boldly, the basic aggregation problem inherent in 
the Richardson formulation derives from the fact that different 
weapons systems possess different policy characteristics. 2 Each 
weapons system, whether it be a Marine Corps Infantry Battalion or a 
MX missile squadron, has a policy mission for which it was designed
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FIGURE 1 
SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC BOMBERS 
(NOTE DIFFERING SCALES) 
SOVIET 
YEAR 
AMERICAN 
(x2) 
and produced to fulfill, To be sure, such systems are often 
multipurpose, but the recognition of such policy missions is central 
to understanding and defining arms competitions, The Richardson 
formulation, by not explicitly considering these policy 
characteristics of weapons systems, is unable to discriminate between 
which groups of weapons we should (and should not) expect to observe 
competition, By employing a decision theoretic approach this paper 
will seek to incorporate the policy characteristics of weapons into 
the resulting theory of arms competition, 
A DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO ARMS COMPETITION 
In the previous section it was argued that the terms of the 
Richardson arms race equations have been poorly operationalized, In 
this section it will be suggested that, to the extent that nations 
engage in arms races, it does not seem likely that they operate at 
either aggregate levels (total defense expenditures) or at 
complementary disaggregations (e, g. , bombers against bombers); to the 
extent that they race at all, it seems more likely that nations 
procure arms which are best suited for off-setting an adversary's 
recent arms acquisitions (e, g, stepped up bomber deployment by one 
nation will trigger new deployment of interceptors by the nation's 
adversary), This, it will be shown, is the result of rational actions 
by cost conscious decision makers, The mathematical formulation which 
follows establishes this result and derives the basis for the 
estimation in the following section. 
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The ''total armed might'' of a nation is a direct extension of 
that nation's foreign policy objectives and its overall strategic 
doctrine, These foreign policy objectives dictate the size and shape 
of the military force a nation will develop, A nation's strategic 
doctrine identifies the types of responses, missions, and tasks its 
military force must be designed to fulfill. Each weapons system 
procured then fulfills a specific policy mission as necessitated by 
the needs related to the nation's strategic doctrine, 
For example, one American foreign policy objective is the 
prevention of nuclear conflict, A strategic doctrine developed 
relative to this objective is mutual deterrence. Specific weapons 
developed to fulfill policy missions under this doctrine are land 
based ICllM's, manned strategic bombers, and sea-based SLBM's. Each of 
which has a policy mission, i. e. that of inflicting (or threatening to 
inflict) a nuclear strike on point targets, 
Nations derive political gain from the use, or potential use, 
of their ''total armed might, '' in accordance with their strategic 
doctrine, 3 The basic behavioral postulate of the decision theoretic 
model to be put forth here is that military decision makers select 
weapons systems and procure armaments in such a manner so as to 
maximize their capability to pursue their nation's foreign policy 
goals, Such choices, of course, are subject to their nation's 
doctrinal, production, budgetary, and technological constraints, 
Given this behavioral assumption, I will define a set of refutable 
hypotheses relating arms race behavior and arms control to the 
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de cision calculus just mentione d, 
More formally, the behavioral assumption we posit is that a 
military de cision make r engages in some sort of constraine d maximizing 
behavior, the objective of which (for the two nation case A and B) is 
to maximize 
(2) 
where q1, • • , , qn represent weapons allocations for country A, given a 
se t of spe cific foreign policy goals; x1, and x2 represent inputs to 
the production of the above weapons systems; w1, , , , , wn represent the 
weapons allocations chose n by an adversary country B, given its own 
-I A set of foreign policy goals; and I (-) represe nts the de cision-makers
political gain or profit from deploying q1, , , , , qn' This maximization 
is subject to the production and technology constraints inherent in 
nation A's e conomy which we will summarize as the implicit production 
constraint 
( 3) 
Thus I postulate each nation maximizes its own political gain, 
TT<-), by selecting , in an optimal fashion, the deployment levels for 
e ach weapons system in its choice set, q1, , , , , qn, and the employment 
levels of productive inputs to armament manufacture, x1 and x2, given 
their policy objectives and with respect to the choices of their 
adversary, w1 • • •  wn' This maximization is performed with respe ct to q 
and x, the armament levels deployed and the production inputs e mployed 
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taking w, the adversary's armament level, as a parameter. 
The approach outlined herein does not assume or depend on any 
formulation of governmental behavior, The model is consistent with, 
or at least not inconsistent with, the rational actor, bureaucratic or 
organizational frameworks deve lope d by Allison, 4 To be sure, the
de cision calculus is most readily appreciated as a two-person (nation) 
model and as such fulfills a rational actor framework of government. 
However, the interactions of various bureaucracies, or the 
conseque nce s of standard operating procedures can result in actions 
which take n altoge ther appear..!!..§ if the bureaucracy or organization 
was acting to maximize political gain as asserted, 
A nece ssary consequence of the behavior assumed above in 
e quations 2 and 3 is that the first order partial de rivatives of the 
following Lagrangian equal zero: 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier, Fmploying a set of very general 
assumptions concerning government behavior and arms growth (see 
McCubbins, 1979) , and applying well-known comparative statics 
techniques we can derive several testable hypotheses concerning arms 
competition, These propositions follow directly from the maximization 
in equation 2, performed individually and inde pende ntly by each 
nation, 
The refutable hypothesis which concerns us here indicates 
between which groups of weapons we should (and should not) e xpect to 
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observe competition for nations with conflicting foreign policy goals: 
RH: Arms competitions develop only between weapons 
systems which are endowed with conflicting policy missions 
by their nation's strategic doctrine and goals, 
Formally, RH states that the rate of change of the jth weapons system 
th for nation A, qj, with respect to changes in the k weapons system, 
wk, for nation B is positive if the weapon's policy tasks are 
incompatible options for each other (j=k) and is zero if the weapons 
are non-competitive options (j�k) for each other (McCubbins, 1979, p, 
5-16): 
> 0 
= 0 
if j=k 
if j�k (4) 
The model thus makes explicit the relation of arms growth to 
the achievement of foreign policy goals by the military force level 
decision makers, The hypothesis suggests that arms races should be 
viewed as competitions between pairs of weapons systems for the 
achievement of incompatible policy goals, and not as competitions 
between the aggregate "armed might" of two mutually distrustful 
nations, 
ESTIMATION 
The basic hypothesis to be examined here is that arms competitions, 
between two reciprocally antagonistic countries, occurs only between 
weapons systems possessed of mutually incompatible policy goals, The 
corollary to be examined is that arms competitions will not occur 
between weapons systems possessed of congenial policy goals: 
H1: Arms competitions occur between weapons systems with incompatible policy goals, 
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H2: Arms competitions do not occur between weapons systems with harmonious policy goals. 
Hypotheses n1 and n2 represent the propositions derivable from the 
decision-theoretic model as postulated in equation 4.  American and 
Soviet stocks of weapons will be employed to test these hypotheses, 
The decision-theoretic model, with its focus on the policy 
characteristics of weapons systems, can be formulated as an n-person 
general sum game, reducible to a Nash bargaining game for the two 
nation case (McCubbins, 1979), The objective function in Equation 2 
posits that both nations will simultaneously determine their optimal 
stocks of weapons, given their policy objectives and constraints, and 
taking into account the simultaneous decisions and policy objectives 
of their adversary, 
Estimation of hypotheses H1 and H2, then, necessitates the 
estimation of a simultaneous equations system for each pair of 
opposing weapons systems, The endogenous variables in the following 
analysis are, then, the actual stocks of various weapons systems 
deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union in their putative 
arms competition, The exogenous (independent) variables are the 
respective GNP's of each nation, where GNP is taken as a proxy for the 
production, budgetary, and technological constraints of each nation, 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The sample of weapons systems, as listed in Table 1, contains 
a cross-section of the conventional arsenals of the two superpowers 
(with the exception of manned strategic bombers, for reasons to be 
explained below), The sampling reflects the specificity with which 
the policy characteristics of weapons systems can be ide'ntified and 
the availability of quality time series on each weapons system, 
Weapons systems with more or less singular policy objectives, and 
where lengthy enough time series are available for estimation, were 
selected, On the whole, then, this excludes strategic missiles and 
naval warships as they serve a multitude of purposes, A multitude of 
purposes, by itself, however, does not present important theoretical 
problems, but rather presents problems with identification of the 
simultaneous system and with estimation of a large number of right-
hand side variables with a shortage of degrees of freedom, 
Strategic interceptors, surface to air missiles (S,A,M. ) and, 
antitank missiles have very specific and well defined policy missions, 
Tanks and tactical aircraft have less specifically identifiable policy 
missions, but it would seem reasonable to expect that their numbers 
grow in relation to the number of antitank and antiaircraft weapons 
deployed by their adversary and vice versa, Manned strategic bombers 
and strategic interceptors present a similar situation; given a policy 
objective to be fulfilled, the stock of strategic bombers should 
increase in relation to the deployed stock of strategic interceptors 
by their adversary. 
TABLE 1 
SAMPLE OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
US STRATEGIC INTERCEPTORS (1964-76) 
US TACTICAL S.A.M. (1968-76) 
US TACTICAL AIRCRAFT (1968-76) 
US HEAVY AND MEDIUM TANKS (1968-76) 
US ANTI-TANK MISSLES ( 1966-76) 
US MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBERS (1964-76) 
SOVIET STRATEGIC INTERCEPTORS (1964-76) 
SOVIET TACTICAL S.A.M. (1968-76) 
SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT (1968-76) 
SOVIET HEAVY AND MEDIUM TANKS (1966-76) 
SOVIET ANTI-TANK MISSLES (1968-76) 
SOVIET MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBERS ( 1964-76) 
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FIGURFS 2, 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2 displays the relationship between the deployed levels 
of Soviet heavy and medium tanks and American antitank missiles. The 
figure suggests that the rapid and exponential deployment of antitank 
missiles by the Unitep States is in response to the ever increasing 
number of Soviet tanks deployed, Interestingly, Figures 3 and 4 map 
mirror images of a disarmament race by the superpowers in manned 
strategic bombers and strategic interceptors. Possibly instigated by 
the advent of long range ICDM' s and SLBM' s, both superpowers, over the 
period of this study, mothballed large proportions of their deployed 
arsenals of these weapons systems, 
A factor w hich exerts a clear, and continuous influence upon 
the American (and thus Soviet) military decision makers, during the 
period of this study, is' the Viet Nam war, The Viet Nam war, by 
changing the policy objectives of the United States, affected the 
deployment levels of U, S, weapons stocks, However, the decade of 
struggle in Viet Nam corresponds, roughly, to the period of study of 
this paper, Thus, the influence of the Viet Nam conflict is felt, for 
the most part, continuously throughout the time series, Accounting 
for the variance provided by the Viet Nam war would therefore not add 
much predictive power and would subtract from an already precariously 
low number of degrees of freedom, As such, I chose not to take the 
Viet Nam conflict into account. 
The actual model to be estimated, then, for the testing of 
hypotheses H1, is of the following form (in reduced form): 
FIGURE 2 
THE CLASSIC ARMS RACE: SOVIET ARMOURED VEHICLES AGAINST 
AMERICAN ANTI-TANK MISSILES 
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FIGURE 3 
THE CLASSIC DISARMAMENTS RACE I: SOVIET INTERCEPTORS 
AGAINST AMERICAN BOMBERS 
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FIGURE 4 
THE CLASSIC DISARMAMENTS RACE II: SOVIET STRATEGIC BOMBERS 
AGAINST AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERCEPTORS 
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where: 
1 the w us 
2 the w SU 
1 wus 
2 w 
SU 
deployed 
deployed 
1 
a + 
2 
a + 
level 
level 
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(5) 
of weapons system 1, by the us. 
of weapons system 2, by the Soviet 
Union, where the policy goals of weapons system 2 is incompatible 
with the policy goals of weapons system 1 of the U, S, 
1 2 
a , a constant terms, 
GNPus' GNPsu = the gross national product of the United States 
and Soviet Union respectively, 
u1, u2 = error terms, 
The comparative statics of the model in the previous section 
(summarized in equation 4), from which hypothesis H1 was deduced, 
offer clear predictions for the sign of the coefficients, P! and Pi · 
The model predicts these coefficients to be positive, 
The simultaneous equations system in equation S is identified 
by exclusion restrictions on the exogenous (independent) variables, 
The coefficients were estimated by the method of two stage least 
squares, In time series data, however, successive residuals tend to 
be highly correlated, resulting in biased estimates, The two stage 
least squares method was therefore augmented by performing a first 
order autoregressive process (quasi-first difference transformation) 
to the regression equations, Such a transformation implicitly assumes 
a first order serial correlation of the residuals, 5 
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The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2. The top 
numbers in each entry are the unstandardized two stage least square 
regression coefficients, the numbers in parentheses below are the 
standard errors. Serial correlation may still pose a problem if 
present, The Durbin-Watson statistics reported in Table 2, though, 
are quite well-behaved; in only 1 of the 12 equations are they less 
than 1.5 or greater than 2 ,5. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The estimated value of the correlation coefficient (RHO) 
employed in the first difference transformation was reported for each 
equation as well, On the whole, these coefficients were small; in 
only 1 of the 12 equations did the estimated correlation between the 
untransformed residuals exceed , 5  in absolute magnitude, 
The figures in Table 2 provide strong support for hypothesis 
H1 and the decision theoretic model, Eight of the 12 interactive 
weapons coefficients were of the predicted sign (positive) and 7 of 
these were significant at the ,OS level, Only 4 were of the incorrect
sign and none were significantly different from zero, Moreover, the 
equations which exhibited coefficients not in line with the 
predictions of the model were the equations with the smallest degrees 
of freedom (6 to 8), and thus the results from these truncated time 
series ..!!!.!!Y not reflect the true underlying relationship. 
Interestingly, the estimation did rather poorly, with respect 
to hypothesis H1, on the estimation of the putative arms competition 
TABLE 2 
TEST OF HYPOTHESIS H1 
DEPENDENT COEFF OF 
ENDOGENOUS CONST INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE 
US STRAT 70.2 0.10 
BOMBERS (160.2) (0.02)' 
SU STRAT -50.6 9.31 
INTERCEPT (1724.51 (2.301' 
US STRAT 169.6 7.72 
INTERCEPT (726.2) (2.87)" 
SU STRAT 25.3 0.10 
BOMBERS {65.31 {0.03)' 
US TACT -106.2 0.18 
S.A.M. {482.0I {0.02)' 
SU TACT 2250.1 -1.54 
AIRCRAFT {648.7)' {2.28) 
US TACT 8312.9 ---0.37 
AIRCRAFT (4247.0l' (0.85) 
SU TACT -2296.5 ---0.28 
S.A.M. {4407.51 {0.441 
USH&M 252.9 0.72 
TANKS {788.0) {0.36)" 
SU ANTI 791.1 0.48 
TANK MISS {606.71 {0.251" 
US ANTI 274863 -166.25) 
TANK MISS {457456) {199.00) 
SUH&M 2444.1 0.00 
TANKS (264.0l' (0.00) 
' COEFFICIENT IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.01 LEVEL 
•• COEFFICIENT IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.05 LEVEL 
INDEPENDENT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
SU STRAT 
INTERCEPT 
US STRAT 
BOMBERS 
SU STRAT 
BOMBERS 
US STRAT 
INTERCEPT 
SU TACT 
AIRCRAFT 
US TACT 
S.A.M. 
SU TACT 
S.A.M. 
US TACT 
AIRCRAFT 
SU ANTI 
TANK MISS 
USH&M 
TANKS 
SUH&M 
TANKS 
US ANTI 
TANK MISS 
COE FF OF 
EXOGENOUS RHO VARIABLE 
GNP 
0.17 
(0.08)" --0.25 
-1.89 --0.22 (0.441' 
--0.56 0.80 (0.25)" 
0.05 0.00 {0.04) 
--0.26 0.57 {0.47) 
2.35 0.00 {0.55)' 
-1.29 0.27 (5.04) 
5.10 0.25 {1.561' 
-2.17 ---0.17 (1.85) 
3.44 ---0.43 {0.22)' 
311.13 ---0.15 (244.001 
0.94 ---0.49 {0.30)' 
d.I. D-W 
10 2.13 
10 2.13 
10 1.91 
10 1.89 
6 1.31 
6 1.91 
6 1.63 
6 1.67 
6 1.97 
6 2.07 
8 1.69 
8 2.23 
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between American antitank missiles and Soviet heavy and medium tanks, 
as well as between American tactical aircraft and Soviet surf ace to 
air missiles, The lack of supportive evidence from the estimation of 
these equations is all the more intriquing in light of the appearance 
of an arms race between American antitank missiles and Soviet tanks in 
Figure 2. As suggested, however, these equations were estimated from 
a very small number of observations and the resulting lack of degrees 
of freedom almost certainly curtailed the convergence of the estimated 
coefficients, 
The production and technology constraint proxy, GNP, does not 
provide a consistent influence in the estimation of force levels, 
Though 7 of 12 coefficients are significant, there is no consistent 
pattern to the signs of the estimated coefficients, 
That arms races are evident between pairs of weapons systems 
deployed for the achievement of mutually incompatible policy goals is 
also supported by the specification of equation 5 and the evidence in 
Table 2. Hypothesis H2 suggests that we should .ill!! observe arms 
competitions between weapons systems whose policy goals are .ill!! 
mutually incompatible, In this regard, recall that Figure 1 had 
suggested that no arms competition was evident between American and 
Soviet manned strategic bombers, Indeed, these manned strategic 
bombers could, all else constant, carry out their policy objectives 
irrespective of the number of manned strategic bombers deployed by the 
other side, 
Hypothesis H2 was tested employing the same sample of weapons 
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systems employed to test hypothesis H1, The model to be estimated, to 
test H2, is similar in form to the model estimated to test H1: 
where 
1 the w us
1 the w 
SU 
1 
wus 
1 w 
SU 
deployed 
deployed 
level 
level 
of weapons system 1, by the u.s. 
of weapons system 1, by the Soviet 
Union, of like variety to weapons system 1 of the U. S. 
a1, a2 = constant terms. 
GNPus' GNPsu = gross national products.
u1, u2 = error terms, 
In this system, quantities of like varieties of weapons 
(6) 
systems, between the US and USSR, were regressed on one another, It 
was assumed by this that the policy goals of similar weapons across 
nations would not be incompatible, However, given the multiplicity of 
uses and policy objectives of these various weapons systems, such an 
assumption may indeed be quite strong, However any resulting bias 
would in fact be disfavorable to the hypothesis under consideration, 
and so the analysis reported in Table 3 is indeed a strong test of 
hypothesis H2, 
Again, to summarize the expectations of hypothesis H2, we 
expect the signs· of the interactive weapons coefficients, �� and �i• 
to be nonpositive, The simultaneous equations system in equation 6 
was estimated by the method of two stage least squares, adjusted by 
autoregression transformation to account for the presence of serial 
correlation, The results of the analysis are reported in Table 3, 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The serial correlation problems posed by the estimation, 
though more severe than in Table 2, are still quite mild. In only 4 
of the 12 equations reported in Table 3 are the Durbin-Watson 
statistics less than 1,5 or greater than 2,5, 
The coefficients reported in Table 3 strongly support the 
decision theoretic model and hypothesis H2, The signs of the 
coefficents of the interactive weapons term in Table 3 unanimously 
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support the prediction of the model, Though half (6 of the 12) of the 
coefficients are of the incorrect sign (positive), with respect to 
hypothesis H2, none were statistically significant at the ,OS level, 
The only 2 significant coefficients of the interactive weapons terms 
were, in fact, negative, 
Though previous investigations have cast doubt on the general 
existence of Richardson arms races, the evidence presented herein 
suggests that arms competitions, for two mutually antagonistic 
countries, between weapons systems with mutually incompatible policy 
goals do in fact exist, Further, the evidence presented suggests that 
arms competition will occur only between such weapons systems, 
In general, the decision theoretic model of armament choice 
and hypotheses H1 and H2 are supported by the tests and model 
TABLE 3 
TEST OF HYPOTHESIS H2 
DEPENDENT COEFF OF 
ENOOGENOUS CONST INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE 
US STRAT 6B1.6 0.40 
BOMBERS (652.6) (2.71) 
SU STRAT 292.0 --0.08 
BOMBERS (80.9)' (0.09) 
US STRAT 82B.6 0.18 
INTERCEPT (723.7) (0.10) 
SU STRAT - 1860.0 4.16 
INTERCEPT (6260.8) (2.62) 
US TACT 1 1388,4 --0.87 
AIRCRAFT ( 1816.2)' (0.71) 
SU TACT 2131.9 --0.01 
AIRCRAFT (6791.B) (0.67) 
US TACT 809.9 0.13 
S.A.M. (762.1) (0.16) 
SU TACT -6228.0 0.64 
S.A.M. (439.0)' ( 1.60) 
USH&M 6809.9 -2.06 
TANKS (1714.6)' (0.78)' 
SU H&M 2776.2 --0.46 
TANKS (220.7)' (0.16)" 
US ANTI -129139 0.24 
TANK MISS (35769)' (26.76) 
SU ANTI 1623.6 0.00 
TANK MISS (1391.1) (0.01) 
• COEFFICIENT IS SIGNIFICANT TO THE 0.01 LEVEL 
'' COEFFICINET IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0,05 LEVEL 
INDEPENDENT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
SU STRAT 
BOMBERS 
US STRAT 
BOMBERS 
SU STRAT 
INTERCEPT 
US STRAT 
INTERCEPT 
SU TACT 
AIRCRAFT 
US TACT 
AIRCRAFT 
SU TACT 
S.A.M. 
US TACT 
S.A.M. 
SUH&M 
TANKS 
USH&M 
TANKS 
SU ANTI 
TANK MISS 
US ANTI 
TANK MISS 
COE FF OF 
EXOGENOUS RHO d.f. VARIABLE 
GNP 
--0.11 0.63 10 (0.20) 
--0.07 0.7B 10 (0.03)" 
--0.61 0.40 10 (0.34) 
1.86 0.42 10 (2.92) 
-1.36 0.72 6 ( 1.76) 
1.99 0,21 6 (2.02) 
--0.59 0.57 6 (0.91) 
6.93 --0.12 6 (0.37) 
2.10 --0.67 6 (0.95)' 
1.03 --0.61 6 (0.08)' 
140.65 --0.06 6 (86.43) 
3.04 --0.57 6 (1.53)" 
D-W 
1.92 
1.02 
1.72 
1.62 
1.32 
1.67 
1.21 
1.66 
1.86 
1.90 
1.39 
1.91 
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specification tendered here, Arms competitions, by this analysis, are 
a reflection of the foreign policy competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, The results of this estimation are all 
the more impressive given the small number of observations from which 
the estimates were derived, 
CONCLUSION 
A simple model of armament choice, wherein military force 
level decision makers make tradeoffs between alternative weapons 
deployments, was developed here to provide a framework for relating 
the policy characteristics of weapons systems to their deployed 
levels. The resulting Nash bargaining game and the comparative 
statics of the optimization problem yielded a refutable hypothesis 
predicting the nature and structure of armament races: that arms races 
will occur only between weapons systems with mutually incompatible 
pol icy missions, 
The simultaneous equations regression analysis reported above 
generated evidence supportive of the hypothesis that arms competitions 
exist only between weapons with incompatible policy missions. There 
did not appear to be any consistent influence from the exogenous 
variable, GNP, although half (12) of the coefficients from Tables 2 
and 3 were significant, 
Lastly, the decision theoretic approach enables us to comment 
on the possibility of effective arms control, Previous arms control 
measures, such as the SALT I and SALT II agreements, have primarily 
19 
established ceiling constraints upon weapons deployments. Such 
agreements (if enforcible) indeed limit the deployed levels of 
armaments. However, ceiling constraints act merely to alter the 
military decision makers' choice set over available weapons systems 
for which to achieve their defined policy objectives. In this 
framework, the decision makers will optimize around the constraint, 
according to their implicit rates of technical substitution between 
weapons (cf. McCubbins, 1982). The point here is that the addition of 
a ceiling constraint to the optimization problem defined in equations 
2 and 3, by eliminating a specific technology from the armament choice 
set, may lead to more dangerous, higher technology, arms competitions 
as the decision makers act to circumvent the arms constraint. It is 
doubtful, then, that effective arms control is achievable through 
ceiling constraints. 
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DATA SOURCES 
Data on the weapons stocks of the United States and the Soviet 
Union was drawn from the following three sources; J. Collins (1978), 
American and .fu?yill Military Trends� the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Washington, D. C. : Center for Strategic Studies); Institute for 
Strategic Studies (1959 to 1977), Military Balance, (London: Institute 
for Strategic Studies); and the Stockhom International Peace Research 
Institute (1968 to 1977), World Armaments .!!ill Disarmaments, 
(Cambridge, MIT Press). 
GNP figures for the US and the USSR were found in World 
Armaments .!!!!! Disarmaments and the Military Balance. The primary
functions of weapons systems were drawn largely from Collins and from 
N. Polmar ( 1975), Strategic Weapons: An Introduction, (New York: 
National Strategy Information Center, Inc. ). 
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F 001NOTES 
1, The basic Richardson model is well known (cf, Richardson, 1960; 
Rapoport 1957, 1960), Other scholars have discussed Richardson 
stability conditions and have extended the model to a multination 
case (O'neil, 1970), Alternative models similar to Richardson's 
have been proposed and the relation between arms races and war 
initiation have been investigated (Caspary, 1967; Friberg and 
Jonsson, 1968; Intriligator, 1964). 
2, Other problems related to the asymptotic properties of the 
coefficients of the Richardson model have been discussed 
elsewhere (Ferejohn, 1976; Schrodt, 1978). 
3. The political gain (or profit) a nation derives from the 
deployment of a specific weapons system can consist of a 
combination of foreign policy and domestic political gain, No 
assumption is made concerning the content of political gain, as 
it is employed merely to represent the returns a nation receives 
from weapons deployment. 
4 ,  I n  general, the bureaucratic and organizational approaches to 
modelling can be based upon models of rational individual 
behavior, wherein the actor is a bureaucrat, or wherein the 
organizational structure of the decision making unit influences 
(or defines) the choices of the individual actors, 
5, In equation 5 if the residuals u1 and u2 are autocorrelated we 
can rewrite them as: 
1t u 
2t u 
pult-1 + el t 
2t-1 + 2t pu e 
where ult is the residual of equation 1 at time t, 
p is the correlation between the residuals, 
ult-l is the residual of equation 1 at time t-1, 
elt is the independent residual at time t,
2t 
Similarly for u , et cetera, 
A first difference transformation of equation 5 would then be 
1 t lt-1 wus - pwus 
2t 2t-1 wsu - pwsu 
a1(1-p) + 
a2(1-p) + 
+ elt
2t 
+ e 
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It should be noted, then, that p (RHO in Tables 2 and 3) gives us 
an indication of the strength of the autoreggressive relationship 
over time, 
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